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attaches to the study of language and history. In the past philosophers have not recognized the mischief produced by the neglect of these two studies. Eucken early saw the mistake of this, "and we are witnessing to-day the phenomenon of the indissoluble connection of language and history with philosophy. In fact, the new meanings given to language and history are meanings of things which happened in the culture and civilizations of individuals and of nations, and such a material casts light on the processes, meaning, and significance of the human mind and spirit." In the introduction Mr. Jones gives some account of the whole movement in Germany towards a religious idealism, as represented by writers like Rickert, Troeltsch, Windelband, and Dilthey. We get also in the chapters on "Universal Religion" and "Philosophy and Religion" an estimate of the relation of Eucken's philosophy to that of Bergson, pragmatism, absolute and immanent idealism, and the neo-Kantian movement. But probably the most interesting chapter in the whole book is that in which Mr. Jones writes of Eucken's personality and influence. Here he tells us of the impression which Eucken has made on his pupils (and not least upon Mr. Jones himself) and of Eucken's endeavors on behalf of the smaller nations of Europe. The book contains an appendix giving a complete list of Eucken's writings, together with those translations which have appeared in English.

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ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, AS PHILOSOPHER AND THINKER: A Collection of the More Important and Interesting Passages in His Non-Political Writings, Speeches, and Addresses (1879-1912). Selected and arranged by Wilfrid M. Short. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. Pp. xii, 552.

"This volume," says Mr. Short in his preface, "is an attempt to present in a convenient form the more important and interesting non-political views to which Mr. Balfour has given expression in his published writings, speeches, and addresses, from the year (1879) in which he published his 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt,' to the present year (1912.)"

It is open to question whether the form is the most convenient that could have been chosen. Out of five hundred and

forty-four pages, two hundred and twenty-two, or nearly half, consist of excerpts from Mr. Balfour's two main contributions to literature, "A Defence of Philosophic Doubt" and "Foundations of Belief." The method of the pastebrush and scissors cannot do justice to books of this type, in which the reasoning is continuous and often, of necessity, involved and difficult. Such books cannot be fully appreciated by readers who 'skip,' however judiciously.

But skipping, of course, may induce an appetite,—on this account doctors have been known to recommend it,—and it is to be hoped that the present volume will lead many readers to subsequent and profounder study of Mr. Balfour's philosophical writings.

The rest of the volume covers a wide range of miscellaneous topics, which do not easily lend themselves to classification. Here are a few, taken at random from the index,—Bacon, Beauty, the Bible, Cancer Research, The Civil Service, Decadence, Eugenics, Golf, Matrimony, Music, Polar Exploration, Political Economy, Psychical Research, Sir Walter Scott! In such an array few will find nothing to interest them, and many will find much. Even on the most trivial or well-worn subjects, Mr. Balfour seldom fails to write or speak suggestively. Furthermore, he is an acknowledged master of language, who often attains to great heights of eloquence. His appreciation of Bacon, for example, and some of his tributes, spoken in the House of Commons, to dead sovereigns and statesmen are worthy to be preserved in a permanent and accessible form, if only as choice examples of modern rhetoric. It is, indeed, the chief merit of this book that it does bring within one cover a large number of Mr. Balfour's non-political speeches, which otherwise might have slept on in the oblivion of newspaper files.

But this merit would have been the more conspicuous had the editor not attempted the impossible task of including "passages representing . . . the essence" of the two philosophical works already mentioned. Yet only a gentle criticism on this point is fitting in a reviewer, since it is the inclusion of the passages in question which chiefly renders the book appropriate for review in this JOURNAL.

It is impossible here to state fully, much less to discuss fully, Mr. Balfour's ethical position as revealed in this volume, but one or two central points may be noted. He accepts (or rather,

in some degree, anticipates, for the passage in question was published in 1879) the distinction, fundamental in much modern ethics, but not yet universally accepted, between things which are good in themselves and things which are means to good.

"All imperatives, all propositions prescribing actions, have this in common that if they are to be of any cogency, the actions they prescribe must be to the individual by whom they are regarded as binding, either meditately or immediately, desirable. They must conduce, directly or indirectly, to something which he regards as of worth for itself alone. The number of things which are thus in themselves desirable is, of course, very great. . . . Now, it is evident that to every one of the ultimate propositions prescribing these ends, and for which, as the ends are ends in themselves, no further reason can be given, there will belong a system of dependent propositions, the reasons for which are that the actions they prescribe conduce to the ultimate end or end in itself" (p. 339).

"The important duties of the moralist," Mr. Balfour continues, "arise from the confused state in which the greater part of mankind are with regard to their ethical first principles. The two questions each man has to ask himself are: What do I hold to be the ultimate aims of action? and, If there is more than one such end, how do I estimate them in case of conflict? . . . Since these two questions can be answered, not by ratiocination, but only by simple inspection, the art of the moralist will consist in placing before the inquirer various problems in ethics free from the misleading particulars which surround them in practice" (p. 342).

Mr. Balfour, however, is not an 'intuitionist,' either in the sense of Sidgwick or in that of Mr. G. E. Moore. For he refers (p. 231) to "various attempts to construct 'intuitive' systems of morals which shall owe nothing to historical development and psychological causation;" and proceeds, "I cannot believe that this is philosophically to be defended." It is clear enough to what schools of thought he is referring, though it may be argued that he does not state their position fairly.

In his discussion of the appropriate spheres of "authority and reason," Mr. Balfour returns to the same question. "If the right and the duty of private judgment be universal, it must be both the privilege and the business of every man to subject the maxims of current morality to a critical examination"

(p. 3); and he goes on, with a wealth of elegant irony, to "picture the condition of a society in which the successive generations would thus in turn devote their energies to an impartial criticism of the 'traditional' view," and to conclude that "our ancestors were not to be pitied because," by contrast with ourselves, "they reasoned little and believed much." But this argument would seem to be beside the point. The right to private judgment in ethical matters is claimed in respect of 'ends-in-themselves,' and questions concerning these, as Mr. Balfour himself points out, "can be answered, not by ratioeination, but only by simple inspection."

In his criticism of Naturalism Mr. Balfour observes (p. 230-31): "It is enough for my present purpose to establish that we cannot plausibly assume a truthward tendency in the belief-forming processes, a growing approximation to verity in their results, unless we are prepared to go further, and to rest that hypothesis itself on a theistic and spiritual foundation." This passage raises controversies too large for discussion here. But it may be argued that the hypothesis of a theistic foundation creates greater difficulties than it dissolves, and further that the development, as it were, of the moral eye, whose function it is to be sensitive to good and evil, is in no way hampered, even if it be in no way helped, by the working of natural selection in other spheres.

We may note one further point out of many. Mr. Balfour expresses the view (p. 255) that, since "the brief fortunes of our race occupy but a fragment of the range in time and space which is open to our investigations, if it is only in relation to them that morality has a meaning, our practical ideal must inevitably be petty, compared with the sweep of our intellectual vision," and we are thus deprived by the growth of modern science of "an ethical end adequate to our highest aspirations." This view is still held no doubt by some, and was probably even more seductive when astronomical discovery was proceeding more rapidly than now, and along more sensational lines. But for others, even if there be no future life for man, the eternal life of a blind mass of matter, however large, shrivels into insignificance beside one short human life full of high endeavour, nay even beside one fleeting hour of human love. This question, also, is one of instinctive feeling, to be decided "not by ratioeination, but only by simple inspection."

London, England.

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